

gence (DNI) who was supposed to have strong unifying authorities; but, as the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act made its way through Congress, the Department of Defense (in collusion with the congressional Armed Services Committee) managed to dilute the new DNI's powers.

This does not mean, however, that the laudable goal of intelligence integration can never be achieved. Vigorous attention to the woeful state of U.S. intelligence by a new administration could overcome the bureaucratic resistance that Zegart laments. Certainly key members of Congress now support such strengthening reforms, including the two chairs of the House and Senate Intelligence committees.

Professor Zegart has done a wonderful job of highlighting the institutional barriers to change, but she is too pessimistic about the possibilities for future reform. Regardless, her work is commendable for its exhaustive research and lucid writing style, as well as for underscoring the key failures that led to intelligence and policy failures associated with the 9/11 attacks.

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**The Coming Age of Direct Democracy: California's Recall and Beyond**  
*by Mark Baldassare and Cheryl Katz. Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007. 256 pp. \$72.00.*

This book recounts the evolution of public opinion in California politics from 2002 to 2007, a period that included the historic recall of the governor and the state's battle with an enormous budget deficit. The backbone of the book is a series of opinion surveys by the Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC) (one author is the president). Students of California politics have come to rely on PPIC surveys for snapshots of public opinion on current events, so the idea of building a book around these surveys has some appeal. For readers unfamiliar with California politics, the surveys and narrative will provide a good introduction.

Readers already familiar with California politics, on the other hand, will not find a great deal new here. Most of the surveys received extensive media coverage when released, and in any case do not paint a textured picture, seldom breaking down opinion by more than partisanship (Democrat / Republican / Independent). As a result, the book does not shed much light on the underlying factors driving opinion, or the root causes of the remarkable events of the period. To go beneath the headlines would require some sort of multivariate analysis, and probably an empirical investigation into how the major events (electricity crisis, budget deficit) impacted individual voters. The concluding chapter's discussion of electoral reforms such as nonpartisan redistricting and campaign finance disclosure would have been more satisfying if it went beyond reporting the public's opinion and considered the extensive empirical literature in political science and economics on the actual effects of those reforms.

Least satisfying are the bracketing chapters (and title) that peddle the idea that the recall has triggered a “coming age of direct democracy.” Leaving aside whether the recall is really a form of direct democracy rather than (as I believe) a tweaking of representative democracy, the facts do not support the notion that the recall was a trigger for heightened use of ballot propositions. The trigger argument seems premised on a table (p. 6) listing the number of California ballot propositions that shows a substantial increase in the last seven years. However, the numbers in the table are inaccurate, apparently reporting the number of ballot *initiatives* (citizen-sponsored measures) prior to 2000, and the number of ballot *propositions* (initiatives + legislature-sponsored measures) after 2000. While the table shows an increase in propositions from 69 during 1990–1999 to 86 during 2000–2006, a quick look at the state’s voter guides indicates there were actually 132 propositions during 1990–1999, meaning ballot proposition activity declined during the recall period (similarly, the number of initiatives fell from 61 initiatives in the earlier period to 48 in the later period according to the Initiative and Referendum Institute). A more accurate count of the number of initiatives (or propositions) would show that the overall amount of direct democracy activity began to grow in the late 1970s, around the time of Proposition 13 (and well before the recall), and post-recall initiative use fits the general pattern of the last 30 years. This is not the only instance where the book exaggerates the novelty of the recent past. To take another example, the book claims that “the use of citizen initiatives to guarantee, rather than restrict, funding began with the passage of Proposition 98 in 1998” (p. 15), when, in fact, initiatives have been used to dedicate education funding since at least 1944, and have been used to allocate other funds, from new buildings to aid for seniors, since 1914. The book’s point that direct democracy activity is becoming increasingly important is certainly correct, as many observers have noted, but assigning a central role in this process to the recall is a stretch, and finding a deeper historic significance to the recall will require more evidence. These considerations aside, the book stands as a useful contribution to the history of an interesting period in California politics.

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**The Right Talk: How Conservatives Transformed the Great Society into the Economic Society** by Mark A. Smith. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2007. 278 pp. \$29.95.

**Branded Conservatives: How the Brand Brought the Right from the Fringes to the Center of American Politics** by Kenneth M. Cosgrove. New York, Peter Lang Publishing, 2007. 364 pp. \$36.95.

About 60 years ago, the conservative thinker Peter Viereck, in order to illustrate the low esteem of conservatism, relayed a joke about one man who was